Is the charge of "Anti-Semitism" really as simple as everyone makes out?

Here is a "thieving gypsy bastard" aka Tracy Ullman (sorry Mrs Ullman for using your image and identity but its meant in general for anyone who experiences racial prejudice who isn't a Jew).

Did you see what I did there? Well actually no you didn't cos there is no word for it? How weird.

If she was Jewish everyone would call it "Anti-Semitism" without thinking. But for poor old Ullman she's not so fortunate and protected and this is simply because of her race! Alarm bells.

For every 2 Jews in the UK their is a Gypsy but you'd never know. Ullman and her people experienced Holocaust just like Jews losing 25% of their racial population but no one says the Germans did a Roma Genocide, and they get no German Compensation Payments. Roma were given no country to "protect" them after the war either.

There is clear and provable prejudice in favour of Jews and so therefore clear and provable prejudice against Roma (swords are always 2 sided). And that prejudice is Racism.

Use of the word "Anti-Semitism" is actually a very serious form of racism but because people don't understand what they are doing they don't understand the error in using it. Calling anything "anti-semitic" is actually being deeply negatively Racist. It is discriminating race crimes based on race and attributing more meaning to certain races while prejudicing against other races.

The only way this issue is going to be solved is with people learning to respect one another and live together. The term "anti-semitism" is actually counter to this desire. Having differential courts of opinion based upon race is actually just amplifying the problem and making it worse. Any race crime should be treated as exactly that. If people need countries to protect their race then every race needs a country, if people need Holocaust compensation then every victim of genocide needs compensation. And so on. Once communities are divided by differential treatment based on race you have Racism. It means all the current pressure to change the law to protect Jewish interests is actually only making racism worse. And I imagine the last thing the Jews want (from what they say at least) is for racism to get worse.

Owning Existence and why Existentialism is nonsense

 So the great problem since Descartes and beyond is Mind and Body. Our experience of the world and the world itself are different. And when we try and locate our experience in the world we have a problem. SRH is here already. Somewhere in the world must be our experiences, but our experiences are of that world. Either their is a secret space we cannot experience where they reside e.g. soul or we have an overlap. Anyway that's the introduction.

The problem for a Capitalist is that we try and own this Mind and these experiences and if we believe in secret spaces those also.

And then perhaps we get struck by their existence which is Real. Often experiences get demoted as just subjective personal perspectives. [running out of power will finish later] but that they exist cannot be denied.

For Descartes the existence of thoughts proved that he himself existed. He was more than owner of those thoughts, he was those thoughts.

But quickly we can see that existence is just existence and its nothing special to us. That one day we won't exist is not a revelation and is nothing personal its just a fact about existence.

Indeed their is nothing personal about existence. So why the dread about non-existence? By existing and non-exiting we join the universe of things. It is a binding experience not a separating experience that Sartre saw.

And why did Sartre see this? Because deep down he was a Capitalist and viewed self and existence in terms of ownership.

Often we demote reality. For Plato's Idealism in his cave physical reality was demoted as an imperfect copy of Ideals in a realm apart from the world. The modern material view inverts this so that computers and brains make imperfect models of a Real existing external world. Phenomenology would demote both these views as both Plato's Ideals and the Materialist Ideal of Physical Reality are just ideas. Reality lies in experience or Phenomena. This is very much more aligned with Eastern Philosophy that sees thoughts and ideas as just sense processes alongside sight and sound. In the West much is placed upon the value of Narrative (ideas) while in the East, Narrative is itself an observable process. In Buddhism everything is demoted to the same level, which is also no level.

A general pattern for contradictions by self-reference

TODO

So Tarski, Turing, Godel and Russel all use the same pattern.

Regarding Halting:

A function H(h,x) determines if program h halts given input x.

Now we can construct I(h,x) which goes into a loop if H(h,x) says 'h' doesn't and vice-versa.

So what about H(I,I)?

If H says it halts we know that 'I' will loop and vice versa.

As usual I need tidy up the logic.

Regarding Tarski:

A function T(t,x) determines if theorem 't' is true given x.

Now we can construct U(t,x) which states the opposite. So that U(t,x) is false if t(x) is true.

So what about T(U,U).

And again with Provability for Godel and Selfincludes for Russel.

Tidy the logic up here.

Now is this the basis for Contradiction by Self-Reference.

If a statement can be transformed into this format it's game over?

Can all self-contradictory statements get into this format.

Are all other formats safe from self-contradiction?

Strong SRH is Dead Digest

 So if last blog didn't quite get there here it is:

Let us begin with the idea of "Contradiction by Self-Reference" CBSR. This is a contradiction that is derived by use of any type of self-reference. There is debate (that I am currently reading) on whether all paradoxes involve self-reference. It seems self-reference paradoxes can be rewritten as infinite paradoxes and vice-versa. But certainly not all contradictions involve self-reference. But that type of contradiction that comes from self-reference is what interests us.

Quick note on method. Theorems taking theorems as input is usually achieved through a mapping from the ordered list of theorems to whatever domain variables have. If the logic is about numbers this is very evident. Theorem(5) can mean both the result of operating on "5" and also the theorem that is listed at position 5 in the ordered list. This is called Godel Numbering.    

So Strong SRH hypothesises "all systems with self-reference can derive contradiction from that self-reference" SSRH (strong self-reference hypothesis).

Note to myself: I need give the logic here a little bit of thought to get it really accurate. Consider the a function like SR(x) that decides if the theorem x has self-reference. SR(x) is true if x involves self-self-reference and false otherwise. However I can't just do SR(SR) since SR is bound to a variable. It would be a whole family of theorems like SR(SRx) the theorem that comes from binding itself to itself with an input x. If "SRn" is the theorem at position n in the list of SR theorems then SR(n) is only self-referential if and when n = SRn. I'm unsure where we can argue self-reference is guaranteed in this construction!

So at the moment I don't know how to create a function like C(SR(x)) which would says that if x has self-reference then you have a contradiction. Which is not quite SSRH which states that the theorem itself is true i.e. SSRH(C(SR(x))) is true. Warning this could all be nonsense I'm just thinking it through.

Anyway concerns out of the way:

Suppose we construct a sequence of logic, a theorem called SSRH to illustrate this. It takes one theorem as input and outputs 1 if the theorem has CBSR and contradiction and 0 otherwise.

So SSRH(SSRH) = 0 is an obvious contradiction. SSRH says that all theorems with self-reference can derive a contradiction yet SSRH(SSRH) say that it doesn't. But that is itself a contradiction as this self-reference has provided a contradiction so the result should be 1. 

But SSRH(SSRH) = 1 is highly problematic too.

It says that SSRH is a theorem with self-reference that generates a contradiction from that self-reference.

Clearly it has self-reference since it has taken itself as input. But it says that doing so derives a contradiction. If we believe it, it has said that its output is a contradiction, and if we don't believe it it means that SSRH is inconsistent. Essentially Godel's result.

If SSRH is consistent then it says its own logic is faulty, which if it was true invalidates the outcome. Not "I am lying" but "I tell contradictions." In standard logic we reject contradictions so it means "If the logic is consistent then reject an assumption that you made in deriving this contradiction." But if we do that then we are actually taking a contradiction to be true! If we accept that the logic was good it would be a contradiction to reject an assumption! This road breaks the very process of logical truth! So we reject SSRH.

So what if SSRH(SSRH) is not the self-reference that is problematic and there is another one. If SSRH contains a self-reference that is problematic within the logic not bound to the variable then the result is even worse and applies to all input. So the problem above stands.

So we must reject the consistency of SSRH all together. There is no such thing.

Now what about Weak Self-Reference Hypothesis (WSRH). This is much more interesting. It says that where there is self-reference and definable conditions then there is CBSR.

Firstly let me introduce the theorem C(x) which sees if x contains a contradiction. (Note: this is proving a useful session as forcing it into logic is really breaking up what I've been trying to say here).

Suppose we illustrate WSRH like this: 

WSRH(x) := C( Conditions(x) && SR(x) )

Which says that if theorem x contains self-refence and it meets the conditions defined by Conditions then it will give a contradiction.

I'm going to leave this here for now cos I need to go back and sort out self-reference and the function SR(x). That might be very fruitful in itself.

Lots of meta-logic functions here (functions deriving results from the logic itself: Godel only had one Beq(x) which decided if a theorem was provable): probably too many.

Not getting stuck into the logic. To recap WSRH suggested that where a domain contained its range (like with fractals) you were guaranteed a "Fixed Point" and the existence of that indicated that SRH was true and problems with self-reference were guaranteed. Let me just define the meta-logic function FP(x) which for a logic decides this. FP(ZFC) is a valid statement since Zermelo-Fraenkel Choice logic enables Godel numbering and so there is guaranteed a statement with one variable in ZFC (e.g. F(x)) which calculates a number which is its own position in the list of theorems.

Note:

F(x) = x is a fixed point

F(n) where n is the position of F(x) in the list of theorems is Self-Reference i.e. n=G(x) is position in the list of theorems or a unique mapping to the domain somehow.

They are different.

OK racing through this. Need to go over the very faulty logic!!!