The Climate Change Conspiracy

Major Correction. 18 Oct 2022.

The pretty obvious error here is that CO2 is given in ppm and other gases are in ppb. That means the figures for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) are 1000x greater than Methane (CH4) and Nitrous Dioxide (N2O) which removes the point of the post.

Here is a graph of CO2 levels from 1750 in orange and other gases adjusted for their relative greenhouse gas effect.

The light blue is CH4 adjusted 30x given that it is 30x more potent a greenhouse gas than CO2.
The light blue is N2O adjusted 300x given that it is 300x more potent a greenhouse gas than CO2.

The result is the effective concentration of greenhouse gases as though they were all CO2. 

It can be seen that the global atmosphere is a 125% better greenhouse in 2022 than it was in 1750. And indeed the greatest contribution to this is CO2.

===

THIS IS WRONG

Much has been said on this but one thing that is certain is that Methane (CH4) is the problem not Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and curbing CO2 emissions is of little benefit. We need to curb CH4 emissions yet no one is saying this. Why?

Two simple facts:

1) The EPA in America says that CH4 is 25 times more potent a greenhouse gas than CO2.

2) CO2 levels have only increased around 30% (280ppm to 380ppm). CH4 has increased around 270% (700 to 1900). 

So if we just look at these two molecules in the atmosphere. 83% of them are CH4. And it CH4 is 25x more potent then CO2 then CH4 is contributing 99% of the global warming. Therefore we need concentrate on reducing methane production not carbon dioxide.

So what creates methane. The answer is cows. With 30% of the Earth Land Surface covered in cows they are the cause of deforestation, habitat loss and the environmental catastrophe. They are also responsible for the increases in CH4.

So if Cows are the problem why aren't we doing anything about it? David Attenborough to his great shame has been quiet on this subject until only a couple of years ago. Thankfully there are growing numbers of non-meat alternatives to cows.

So why is the cow issue not the centre of the environmental and climate debate? That is the mystery.

An interesting thing about cows is that they are worshiped by the Aryans. Today that is the North Indians and areas of Asia but really it could be seen as what was called the Caucasian race. Nazi Germany worshiped the cow too but they were annihilated by the Americans and the Russians.

A little remnant of that era is the humble Bovril spread. Made from cows (Bovine) and supposed to contain the energy of life (Vril) from which it got its name. The Nazis had a secret society called the Vril Society loosely based upon this Vril idea.

But the worship of cows continues in the Ham-Burger which is made from cows and which the Americans have marketed around the world. There is a huge lobby group promoting the cow in America and the West. In the UK the national food is supposed to be cow, and the government subsides and promotes the cow as a food stuff. Everyone in UK pays for cows through their taxes.

How many cow eaters don't realise they are actually brainwashed by an industry that has its roots in ancient cow worship!

Civilisation depends on Slavery

 Every civilisation was built on slavery. Perhaps shocking but all the great achievements of mankind owe their existence to the imprisonment and enslavement of people.

Traditionally we try to justify human progress through technology. Fire, farming, tools are all argued to have increased efficiency and so bought humans time to spend on civilisation like arts and thinking.

But as we see today all that we do with this time is make more thing and become richer. To buy us time we need slaves to do the work for us. This way we remain rich, but have time for civilisation.

The last great slave owning civilisations were the Nazis in the 1930s and a generation before that the Americans. Without slaves neither civilisation would have happened.

The reason that slavery has diminished was the discovery steam in the 1700s which means that instead of using humans to turn food into work, we could turn coal into work. It just so happened that Britain was the world's greatest coal producing country right through the 1700,1800 and most of the 1900s. It is no surprise that during this time Britain was the world's largest empire.

Empire and civilisation require energy and work. You wither have slaves or machines or both.

So we don't need any romantic ideas of "freedom" and "justice" and need only have a very straightforward logic developing across history.

SRH must be the Universal Theorem

This is still just intuitive, just hammering it down. It may be (probably is) just nonsense.

A Universal Theorem (U) which does not account for itself is not universal because it leaves out U.

Therefore a Universal Theorem MUST involve self reference.

Now Godel's Theorem states that a logic system with sufficient self-reference to generate a Godel Statement (Beq originally) can be shown to be either inconsistent or incomplete.

Similarly we can propose a broad statement that any system with self-reference is subject to limitations.

This looks bad for a Universal Theorem because a U must include self-reference, and so its very seeking Universality introducing Limitations. But the Universal by definition has no Limitations.

(Hofstadter notes that this seems to be true in his book, but offers no further comment.)

However a Theorem that states that all self referential systems have limitations can rescue itself.

The specific limitation of the SRH is that it allows for its own Universality!

Self-Reference actually allows the SRH to be Universal because it states that all self-referential systems are limited.

SRH is thus not only a candidate for the Universal Theorem, but must be the Universal Theorem since the UT must involve self reference.

(This is kind of following Kant style Categorical Imperative reasoning).

===

Let me try and make even more simple.

A Universal Law must account for itself and so must involve self reference.

But Godel has shown that self reference can lead to contradictions limiting either the completeness of consistency of a system. (This needs to be expanded. How do we get from Godel to the SRH theorem that All cases of Self-Reference are self limiting. Perhaps its sufficient to say that All Cases of Self-Reference may be subject to self imposed constraints). (I like to think the general form of the problem lies in U not being able to account for -U. All these self-reference issues come from constructing a sentence that on the initial level is true, but through self reference makes a meta statement that negates this truth. If someone gave you all -U statements you could construct all the sentences of U (ignoring Godel), although there is no system to prove within -U --- just free styling).

So a Universal Law appears to be a contradiction in that to be universal it must entail constraints.

However if that is the Universal Law : "that all laws with self reference entail constraints" then we have a second level of self reference. The Universal Law states that "All Laws With Self-Reference Entail Constraints." So says the critic: that law cannot be universally true because it itself has no constraints. But then it does because that becomes its constraint! Universality is its constraint!

More logically the law that states that "All Laws With Self-Reference Entail Contradiction" is a law and so applies over itself and so that self reference must entail contradiction. And the contradiction is that this Law applies to itself without contradiction!

Am I really escaping the "I am a Liar" infinite regress here or does it hold consistently? TODO.

===

Is there something to add here. A trivial Universal Theorem must be a Tautology, it must always be true for everything precisely because it accounts for everything. But already we are making theorems about UTs so the job is not done. So the issue here is meta statements or self-reference statements. A UT can be constructed from looking at the issues surrounding self-reference itself. Or said another way the form of a UT can be constructed independent of anything else. This is very Kantian, very synthetic a priori.

Ok what am I actually talking about. In Natural Language SRH is a statement this is supposedly true for all statements. So is a UT any statement that is true for all x.

∀x | U(x)

Now we are arguing that this should run into problems cos "∀x | U(x)" is one such x

But what if we have the meta function Sym(x) which is true if x is made of symbols. Then obviously 

∀x | Sym(x)

for all statements.

Now SRH says 

∀x | R(x) & SRH(x)

where R(x) is true if x refers to itself.

If we borrow from Godel then #(x) would be the Godel Number of x.

So R(x) is true if x is about #(x)

ok need to stop this is rapidly becoming nonsense. 

=== BELOW IS A SCRATCH PAD OF NONSENSE ===

Could start from a Naïve Universal Theorem which just makes a statement about  ∀x | NT(x).

Now what is wrong with that? We know "Set of All Sets" is a problem in set theory from Russel's Paradox. But its more than just ∀x it requires the idea of "is a member" (∈) to get the contradiction. 

∀x∃a | x ∈ a & x ∉ x

SO if I got that right then for all 'x' there exists an 'a' such that x is a member of 'a' and x is not a member of itself. Now when a = x you have a contradiction so ∄a.

'a' we interpret as the set of all x where x is not a member of itself.

Suppose we just invent an operator ⊕ which denotes self-reference so that 

x ⊕ y is true iff x refers to y.

For example the expression "∀x∃a | x ∈ a & x ∉ x" ⊕ a is true.

Do we require a quote symbol to make meta statements? Can SRH be done without meta statements?

OK Godel names predicate statements by counting that is mapping to integers.

That means that by isomorphism any statement about an integer refers to a statement. So everything is self referential in PM. And what of self-reference not even noticed.

So can we say that "f(x) ⊕ x" is true for all x because the expression binds to x

So can we say that "f(x) ⊕ y" is true when y = x

The thing of interest 

"f(x) ⊕ y" is also true when y is the Godel Number of f(x)!!

Now we can have some fun (and probably show that ⊕ cannot exist)!

--

Godel numbering maps all statements in PM to Natural numbers. And he uses self reference to find a contradiction. But we want to make statements about self reference itself. We want PM to say something about self-reference.

Trivially take a function f(x) which computes x(x) that is the statement at position x in the list computed with x as variable. Note the domain is just the list of functions with arity = 1.

Perhaps another g(f, x) which computes f(x). That composes all f with all x. Down the diagonal are the self reference computations.

r(f,x) = {1 if f=x and 0 otherwise} is beyond trivial but it does provide a concrete function that makes a statement ABOUT self reference.

But r(r,r) = 1 is meaningless. f was from the domain of arity-1. g is from the domain of arity-2.

r1(f,x) = {1 if f=x, 0 if f != x and undefined if f(x) is not defined}

Now if the domain is expanded to all statements then 

r1(r1,r1) = undefined.

good.

---

here's an interesting meta property: the number of bits set in a number. So there are meta properties of binary numbers that cannot be computed in a simple mathematical way from their decimal numbers. ? Kind of Chaitin Omega like proofs where can prove that to know a property of a number is a contradiction through self reference

---

OK be clear on one thing. Due to the mapping for sentences in PM onto the Natural Numbers any statement about numbers is also a statement about theorems. You do not need a quote or a naming function itself.

But this now goes back to an original insight on SRH in 2007. The mapping of sentences from PM (Principia Mathematica) to N (Natural Numbers) is "outside" PM. It is something done by an "observer.". Check this. Did Godel actually need a GodelNumbering() function for his proof or was the numbering assumed? There is a post in the blog calling Godel Numbering the actual SRH. The ability to map self into the domain is the source of all SRH problems.

---

A definition of Self Reference probably useful:

Something is Self-Referential when the Domain Extends Over the Self. DEOS.

---

So a function that determined self reference would take a function and look to see if the domain extended over the self.

ϱ(f, D) = {1 if f ∈ D, 0 if f ∉ D}

WARNING however ∈ here means corresponds to a member of D even by bijective correspondence between the domain of f and D. In other words if f belongs to a domain F which has a bijective mapping to D then f corresponds to a member in D.

So let me use a ε B to mean 'a' corresponds to a unique member of domain B.

In reality this will mean that 'a' is one of an ordered countably infinite domain which therefore maps to the Natural Numbers. The Natural Number it corresponds to can be seen as the index of 'a'.

We are back to Cantors incredibly powerful use of ordered lists!

So accurately a self referential function ϱ tests f like this:

ϱ(f, D) = {1 if f ε D, 0 otherwise}

That is f is a member of an ordered countable domain which is isomorphic with D.

Lets curry the function for each domain, and N is what we want for PM.

In PM everything is a natural number. Functions are interchangeable with index numbers. In an infinite domain there are a lot of possibility so many in fact that almost nothing is impossible (except Beq for one)

So here's our SR function. And all it does is check that f is a Natural Number. Once done we know that DEOS (the Domain Extends Over the Self) through isomorphism.  

ϱ(f) = true (for Domain = Natural Numbers)

Now usual process. If ϱ is a valid function then what of: 

ϱ(ϱ)

Which asks basically is ϱ a Natural Number (or maps to)

Well if it is isn't then it doesn't allows self reference, yet that is an example self-referential!

So if it is in N then it allows self reference, but if it isn't then it doesn't. So since that's self-reference then ϱ necessarily must be in N.

But that argument is a bit like the Ontological Argument for God. Just because it can't be false doesn't mean it is true! It could be a contradiction

Now Suppose we have a new function (following Turin's Halting problem method)

AND NOTE WE ARE USING EXISTING PROOF SCHEMAS THAT USED SELF REFERENCE IN A THEORY SEEKING TO FORMALISE SELF_REFERENCE. THE GOAL IS A THEORY THAT CAN MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE SCHEMAS OF GODEL, TURING, RUSSEL, BERRY, CHAITIN etc (and we assume will trip itself up in the same way as it will be self referential, but the hope is that it will trip up its own reference to self-reference and so the trip up takes itself out and steadies things .. certainly. I think Phil Scanlan may have already made this type of argument I need go back and reread) 

For a particular Domain D and a function f

If f(f) is a defined or a valid statement that ϱ(f) is true as f allows self reference.

Now what if f(f) is not defined e.g. f(a,b) is a 2-ary function then ϱ(f) ↑ 

Now ϱ(ϱ) cannot be false as its an example of self reference itself. But it could be undefined ↑. This makes more sense and if Q(Q) is true we are saying something meaningful.

NOW PROOF that ϱ CANNOT EXIST (courtesy of Turing)

Let ϱ(x) be the function that determines if partial function x can take itself as a parameter. This is true if the domain of ϱ extends over itself (DEOS). This is the critical definition of Self-Reference here.

Now let us make a new function ϱ'(x) = {if ϱ(x) is true then undefined, else true}

That is to say it is undefined for itself and otherwise defined.

Now what of ϱ'(ϱ')

If it is defined we know that ϱ' takes itself as a parameter and so ϱ(ϱ') must be true.

But by definition if ϱ(ϱ') is true then ϱ'(ϱ') is undefined. A contradiction.

So ϱ'(ϱ') must be undefined. In which case ϱ(ϱ') is false. But by definition ϱ'(x) is true when ϱ(x) is false. A contradiction.

This is not only a proof that ϱ cannot exist, but uses the classic "liars paradox" of SRH to prove it.

Now note that we have a theorem about self-reference that is defeated by self-reference.

REMINDER that the expectation is that the Universal Theorem will we a theorem about this vulnerability of total theories to self-reference, but it will gain totality by slipping through its own vulnerability (analogous to the All Rules Have Exceptions [ARHE]).

===

Recap

A partial function ϱ(f) that determines whether f(x) can take itself as a parameter is a contradiction. So no function exists that can determine whether another function f(x) is valid for its own input.

That is to say that we cannot determine (in PM) whether a function can include self reference.

If we expand that by analogy (and this is pure speculation) then we cannot determine whether something is self referential. So even if there is a universal theorem about self reference

But there is a universal theorem about self reference. It is this theorem that You cannot determine whether something conforms to DEOS.

Suppose the Universal Theorem is that you cannot determine whether DEOS (domain extends over the self).

But we have a contradiction because we are saying Universally that you cannot determine whether the domain extends over the self. But in this case you can because we are saying in ALL CASES that you cannot tell if the DEOS and so DEOS must be true here.

As noted before

If U(x) is the universal theorem then Q(U) must be true as  U must apply to itself.

But we have a proof that Q cannot exist. So we can make the statement Q(U) for U.

In which case lets ask is there a function G (God/Godel) that determines if f is the universal function? i.e. f extends over all domains.

So that is G(U) is true by definition. On aside are there any other function candidates for U or is it a single by definition?

Now we have shown that Q is a contradiction so it is not U. That is we cannot determine rules to find out whether a function conforms to DEOS (it takes itself, it is self-referential).

Q is of interest to us because we want to say that all q where Q(q) are problematic. But U is a member of q by definition. 

Introduce idea: The Set of all f that are self referential cannot be determined. btw this is Russel's Paradox.

(bad notation but q is now the set of all function that take themselves as parameters, i.e. self reference functions)

Now we are saying that there is no Q to determine the set of q. Yet we know of an instance where U is a member of q.

Is this a contradiction? #TODO

Plus we can't dismiss U because that would become the universal theorem! Another contradiction. This is like the Ontological Proof of God. Berry's paradox also. There is some ultimate theorem, even if that theorem is that there is no ultimate theorem.

This is a problem even if the small realm of PM. Ignoring other theorem domains.

REMEMBER what you are doing here is not just mucking around with paradoxes and contradiction. It is trying to formulate a theorem ABOUT those paradoxes to lay out the limits of self-reference and Universal theorems.

RECAP.

1. The Universal theorem U(x) by definition makes a statement over ALL x.
2. Therefore U(x) must be self-referential as U(U) must exist.
3. Let us define Q(f) which is true if f takes itself as a parameter. Q cannot exist.
4. It means we cannot determine the set (q) of theorems which take themselves.
5. Yet we know that U(x) is a member of q by definition (since to be universal it must take itself).
6. So we can create a function that finds at least 1 member of q.
7. Let us make a weaker function G(x) which correctly identifies U, i.e. like Q but only needs be true for 1 element.
8. Now if G = U we have the same problem. So G != U. G is not the universal theorem but it can identify it (John to Jesus?). Yet doesn't G need to be true for all x? So is it the U.
9. How many universal theorems are there? Try and make some more. J(x) = true is universal. Can't we use J(x) to create a contradiction like above since J(J)
10. Now this is the problem. All J(J) run into problems. But a theorem about this may not... #TODO shows that above Q argument if problem for all U. Then make one function that says this and see if it escapes its own SRH problem. 

Almost there?

just resaying this: the point is not to get stuck into self-reference paradoxes. Its to find a theorem that survives them, but which by definition is universal. And we hope if we express the SRH theorem properly we will have a theorem ABOUT self reference. In other words it will be 2nd order self reference. Not just an entity referring to itself, but that entity being a meta statement ABOUT self-reference. The hope is that the self-defeating nature of Self-reference will create an escape clause. As in  the rule ARHE.

formalising that it would be 

∀R∃x | R(x) ↑

For all R there exists an x such that R(x) is undefined. {R, x} come from the same domain thanks to Godel numbering (originally Cantor) that sees a 1:1 correspondence between statements in PM and natural numbers. Diagonalisation being the original self-reference problem arising from countable sets.

OK #TODO you're mis bind you variables..... go again!

Now if the above statement corresponds to function Y then we can say

∃x | Y(x) ↑

Now if x = Y then

Y(Y) ↑

Which is to say that y is undefined for itself. In other words it It doesn't apply to itself, it allows Y to be its own exception. 

Suppose we did something mad.

∀R∄x | R(x) & ¬R(x)

For all R there is no x such that R(x) and Not R(x) which is standard contradiction. You might argue this must be true. But if this statement is Z then

∄x | Z(x) & ¬Z(x)

...TBC

Anthropic Principle is relevant.

All self-reference proofs depend upon the ontology created by the self. That is by making a statement we commit to an ontology and that is then shown to be a problem.

"I am a liar" is a problem because like Descartes we commit to a thing e who is a liar. The dispute with Descartes is not whether there is a lie, but what is the lie. For Descartes there is the body of the liar and the spirit of the lie. Quine's Use and Mention perhaps.

SRH always makes dichotomies or dialectics in order to escape breaking things. Indeed the proof of SRH involves why statements and meta statements exist in the first place. Like Ryle it may turn out that the "sense" changes in order to escape the contradiction that come from SRH. The mind is forced to see a thing in the two senses of "use" and "mention" to escape deep problems. Potentially?

The thing is once we have this statement "I am a liar" we definitely have something. There is no escaping this. It becomes the start of our ontology and we can't get rid of it now without creating a new ontology that does not have it. This is a common mistake in thinking. So many times people have something they want to get rid of, but they never realised they are already doomed. Whatever they do began life with the thing they want to get rid of, and so everything they do comes from this thing. Even the Nazis trying to get rid of the Jews just made the Jews stronger. This comes out in the latest version of Jules Verne's Time Machine (2002) where Alexander Hartdegen eventually discovers that he can't use the Time Machine to save Emma because it was her death that led to his inventing the Time Machine. Once we have the Death of Emma as our ontology we are stuck in that universe. (Sounds a bit Copenhagen Multiverses). Is it SRH that leads to this? Indeed Emma Hartdegen is a contradiction!

So any proof of this type starts with a thing T and then shows that T(T) is a problem.

Even those constructive proofs construct something from T that becomes the problem.

Indeed T(x) = F(T(x)) is the whole problem.

So "I am a liar" is fine until we realise that it refers to an entity that has been created by itself. Now it won't go away. We are stuck. By reading it we are committed to a world that seemingly can't exist and yet it does because we read it.   

Anthropic Principle is similar. We start thinking about the Universe and we quickly realise that the main thing we can say about the universe is that there is a thinking thing in it. Indeed that thinking thing precedes the thoughts about the universe. So no matter how great the universe is, this thing must be greater! I can think that the universe does not exist, but I can't think that this universe does not contain me or thinking.

So all statements create an ontology that contain themselves. And the contradictions always (prove this) revolve around this a priori ontology being challenged by the constructed ontology.

A(x) is a function that is true if A(A) is defined otherwise false. Effectively from the scope of the function it its realising that in returning a value it exists. Its this subtle kind of Ontological Proof that exists (but is suspect a la anatta). If I am answering the question then I have bound myself to the variable and so I must exist. Cognito Ergo Sum effectively. If I am doubting that I exist then who is doubting? You can't doubt that there is doubt. The very action of doubt a priori commits you to some existence. If I am thinking there must be a thinker. And Kant Transcendental arguments. The very starting point of a mental process or argument already presupposes certain things.

what of the Liar.

L(x) is a function that is True if L(L) is false.

Defining things in terms of themselves is the classic SRH.

L(x) -> !L(x)

So is the DEOS is not sufficient for SRH. We are saying DIOS also (Definition Independent Of Self)

DIOS

Now this is actually the original SRH. And problems are obvious. Where is the demarcation between self and not-self. A Quine produces itself as output. Somehow the program "contains itself."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_recursion_theorem

But loosely if F(x) := F(x) we have problems. Original SRH sort to find out whether it could tell whether a recursion was going to be a problem or not.

Halting is one such problem of recursion. Halting is not decidable. So already its impossible to decide whether a particular recursion (self definition) will be a problem! So failure already.

Now can we reconstruct this to show the SRH

(1) SRH involves itself in the definition

(2) The contradiction so created liberates SRH to be a Universal Function.

== Note I am unclear right now the difference between DEOS and DIOS.

----

A simple proof a la Turing to add to problems of SRH

Let R(x) determine whether x is a recursive function. In other words R(x) is true if x is defined anywhere in terms of x(x)

Let us construct R'(x) { if R(x) return 1 else return R'(x) }

Now what of R(R')

If it is true then R' is recursive but by definition R' simple returns 1, and if it is false then R' is not recursive yet by definition it calls itself. So simple contradiction.

This suggests that R'(x) is impossible. You cannot determine whether a function is recursive. Step up from the Halting problem which deals with recursive function that never reach an exit statement.

Now it could be that R(x) is actually defined in terms of R'(x). So that R(R') ... follow this

Quick check what of A(x) = B(x) and B(x) = A(x). R(A) appears not to be recursive since its defined in terms of B(x). But since B(x) is defined in terms of A(x) R(A) is true.

=Universal Engineer
And this links to something ages ago on Universal Engineer and Walle. Can a robot fix itself like Walle in the cartoon? Well in some cases yes and in some cases no. If you need eyes to coordinate the operation then you cannot fix your eyes. This is the idea of "Dependency" which is key to original SRH (see summary). The Universal Engineer is a function that takes a blue print and a function and basically does "Unit" Testing on it. It breaks the function down into separate sub function Units and checks that they "work" as in have the same output as the Blue Print for all inputs. The UE works recursively on all units until it can't subdivide anymore.

>Therefore a function must have an atomic level
>A function must be composable from sub functions.
I spent a few days on this in 2010 and didn't resolve it. Can you write a function system that cannot be composed into units. Basically system composed from mutual dependencies. The kind of thing that in software development is called uncoupling. Can all systems be completely uncoupled into atomic functional style programming.

Daniel Dennett says that all computable processes can be reduced to a single thread. So anything that can be computed can be done in a simple list of instructions. That is because a Turing Machine can transform any number into any other number (or list of symbols into any other list of symbols). And a Turing machine can do all computations. But what does this say about function compositions and recursion? Look into that!

So lets say that Walle is a UE. If he has a blue print of himself and seeks to do checks he must avoid the situation where any component is fixing itself. This suggest redundancy! 

Suppose you had three UE, namely A,B,C. They check each other. Suppose A says that B is faulty, who says that C is faulty who says that A is faulty. Now if  A is faulty then we can reject its statement about B which means B is unknown state. But that means that C is correct. So C is not faulty (or just lucky). But that means that B is faulty, which means that A was actually correct.

So the problem here is that a stopped clock is correct twice a day. Being correct in a single instance does not tell you whether something is working. Working by definition means correct in all cases it is defined for. A UE is supposed to confirm that something is Working and isolate the subcomponents that are not through recursion on parts. Note that the system {A,B,C} here is just another UE(x). It may turn out that a UE(x) is recursive. 

TO PROVE: is UE(UE) a problem. Can a machine universally self determine its own functioning? But given that a UE(x) can be of any complexity isn't the whole world a massive UE(x). We know that machines can be fixed so a UE(x) does exist. If my computer program has a bug we can debug it if we know what it is supposed to do. Does the world do this simply by statistics and democracy? If 100 UE agree that another UE is faulty, and that UE thinks the 100 are faulty so we take the side of the 100? Isn't this the problem humans face. 100 people say the stock market is okay, and one says it will crash what do we do?

So the question anyway is what happens when UE(UE) i.e. Walle computers try to fix themselves. What are the limits and is such a thing impossible because of SRH.

Returning above UE bit, so the question for R(x) is about function composition and whether this can be determined.

A(x) = B(x), and B(x) = A(x) means that R(A) must be able to look through the system and determine composition. So we are assuming that functions are not atomic and can be broken down into components. (Is this possible or is there a contradiction). And then there are may options.

Suppose A(x) = B(C(x)). In other words A(x) achieves the same result not of B nor C but B applied to C.

Now suppose C(x) = B(C(x))

R(A) is that recursive? Well not immediately cos A is defined in terms of B(x) and C(x). But it turns out that B(C(x)) achieves the same result as A(x). So isomorphically they are the same (the domain and range map perfectly between the functions). So R(A) returns true. But that makes R(x) as special a function as UE(x) because it is able to look at all sub-processes within a function and determine isomorphism.

So we can prove that allowing R(x) would generate a contradiction. But given what R(x) is does this also spell problems for UE(x) and any system that seeks to make formal decisions about function and system composition. Namely is Walle in trouble when it comes to diagnosing and fixing himself, and trouble that he can't even determine.

These are the kinds of problems that arise with "self". They introduce uncertainty and break systems. That is OSRH.

=Quick SRH Summary (again)
Lets make the distinction now. OSRH is the AIME problem of a computer processing its own input and becoming meaningless. AIME came from Self-Consciousness ideas that if you feed a computer its own output you can create a sense of "self". Amazing to see this still in the research even last week. If you feed something its own input you get a fractal, and (TO BE PROVED?) the fractal organises around the Fixed Points which are guaranteed if the domain is within the range of the function. See Kleene Fixed Point theorem here (states there is always a fixed point?). Fixed Points of recursive/self referential systems are seen as the essence of the problem of SRH (TO BE PROVED). All the famous paradoxes are corollaries of Fixed Points. OSRH is really The Paradox Theorem that should correspond to any Fixed point Theorem. If you have a Fixed Point you can construct a paradox (TBP).  

+1 Theorem, Horatio Theorem, God Theorem all derive from the idea that a Universal Theory must have a fixed point, must be self referential, must be recursive and so must break allowing in Godel Incompleteness, and showing that the system must be derived/depend upon things OUTSIDE itself. A Universal Theorem is a contradiction.

The thoughts of this blog page suggest that this itself may be the Universal Theorem because by proving that all theorems can't be universal you have a universal theorem. Which looks like a contradiction BUT if the theorem is saying that all theorems have an exception/incompleteness/or hole then that hole can let the theorem itself through without contradiction. So the God Theorem is actually its own dependency! This sounds a bit like Scanlan's book (which I scanned in 20 mins to get the gist) need to go back and check.

So OSRH was to do with recursion. Diverted SRH is to do with entities, actually naming a "self" and "x". OSRH is expressed in functions, it is processes it leads to infinite regress and Non-Halting. DSRH is set theory like ∀R∃x and leads to contradictions. Are they the same and just a notation difference, or is there an actual difference.
...This has become unclear   

To conclude todays input there is no set of rules to determine whether a function is recursive. Identical to the Halting problem. Which says impossible to tell if recursion terminates.

What we are looking for in SRH is to show that presence of recursion is a problem. But we can't even decide whether recursion is present.

Could we show that if recursion is not present then it halts. And equally if recursion is not present then no contradictions. Equally recursion (analogous to self reference in SRH) is required for contradiction. Kleene here. Equally presence of Fixed Point is death knell. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_recursion_theorem

Rogers's fixed-point theorem. If  is a total computable function, it has a fixed point.

YOU NEED IMPROVE YOUR MATHS HERE AND MAKE ALL THIS WELL FORMED

and don't forget the gold standard is a theorem ABOUT all these issues surrounding self-reference. Simply using self-reference to cause problems is not the point.

== 

Just doing this in code now. Suppose like in Visual Studio you had a function R(x) which finds all references to a function (whatever this exactly means). So that R(A) is a list of functions that calls A. Then we can simply look to see A ∉ R(A). Now of interest to SRH. Does the presence of A ∈ R(A) prove a problem. Right now in Visual Studio it does. I have a method on the derived class M'() that does essentially the same thing as the base class M(). As a result someone has called the base method M() instead of the derived method M'(). Can I make M'() override the base method M()? Well what if M'() is defined in terms of M(). I need make sure that M'() does not refer to itself but refers to the M() in the base class. Okay can see this is not by itself a problem if M'() has a bailout clause that terminates recursion. An interesting problem not faced before of recursion involving polymorphism!

Anyway that shows that A ∈ R(A) is not the end of the world as long as A() is defined in such a way such as A(A | 0) meaning A doesn't ALWAYS call itself and can bailout by calling on something else (i.e. +1, Horatio, God theorem).

Horatio Theorem: A function where all "paths" call itself will never halt. "Paths" is the same concept (and problem) as components/Units above. The number of paths is also the number of Units/Components. Is this true: where there is a path there is an interface and a unit test?

So can we rehash the UE problem into defining the interfaces. Is there a theorem determining the maximum number of interfaces in the computation. Isn't this the same as the number of jumps/function calls. So the code pointer is either "add" or "jmp". Does a jmp means an interface? It means a context are these the same. Its the jmp which is the basis of recursion and which enabled SRH.

Note here the difference between OSRH and DSRH. OSRH allows a jump back to the start to mean "self." While for DSRH this is not self as it could be implemented by an identical piece of code.

OK difference between OSRH and DSRH (renaming Pure-SRH PSRH)

A friend told me he was teaching programming. He set the problem of making it print "Hello World!" continuously hoping the student would come up with this.

10 Print "Hello World!"
20 Goto 10

When he came back the program indeed did print "Hello World!" continuously. He broke execution and looked at the code.

10 Print "Hello World!"
20 Print "Hello World!"
30 Print "Hello World!"
40 Print "Hello World!"
...

Given an infinite amount of memory the two pieces of code are the same!

OSRH does not care! "Self" for OSRH is isomorphic with. We could call it Duck SRH. If it looks like Self and smells like Self then it is self.

PSRH is different. Self means same entity. Okay this is a problem been aware of since AIME but not fully formalised. Its a subtle difference. What does this mean:

"This sentence is false" 

we start
10 a = "This sentence of false"
20 a is false
30 Means "This sentence of true "
40 b = "This sentence of true"
50 b is true
60 Means "This sentence of false"
70 Goto 10

So when we think about it we actually create 2 entities and spin around between them infinitely. And we actually do that many times. Eventually we realise the loop. Interesting closing the loop is when we bail out. "Been Here Before" we think. So "loop" is actually a meta statement in our minds. We don't actually loop. That is interesting in itself. 10 Goto 10 while a machine instruction for the coder is actually a meta statement that we want an infinite loop.

But this is all OSRH. Pure SRH would say self must be the same entity.

x = "x is false"

But then you have the difference between x and the name x. both x and "x is false" are names for an entity. That entity is then bound into the statement.

OK take a break...

  

Liar Paradox DSRH make this work....

∃x | !x(x)

===

Lets leave vague attempts at formalising this for a moment...

Lets take that proof that ϱ(x) which is to say that no function exists that can determine if a function allows self reference DIOS and PSRH (that is domain extends over self and Pure Self-Reference cos we are talking about reference to entities)

In essence we just have a situation where a function makes a statement and it contradicts itself.

Lets take Berry's Paradox as well. The least uninteresting number.

So we have P(x) where x ∈ N, P ∈ Properties is true if x is an interesting number.

And Q(x) is true if x is the smallest member of a set.

Now Q(x) -> P(x) that is the smallest member of a set is an interesting number

So the set P'(x) is the set of uninteresting numbers. But ∃x | (Q(x) & Q'(x) is a contradiction.

Now is this the universal pattern.

Russel's works.

Godels's works.

Do Turing's...

And Do the most basic Liar

Once you have a general theorem to describe paradox apply to self to see if a Universal complete theorem.

  

Quantum Mechanics and step closer to proof of SRH

https://www.science.org/content/article/reality-doesn-t-exist-until-you-measure-it-quantum-parlor-trick-confirms

So Quantum researchers have found an even simpler way to show that Quantum experiments do not reveal a hidden reality, they are involved in creating that reality.

Now wasn't it obvious this would happen. As humans explore the world wasn't it always going to happen that they would start to create theories about the very process of reality?

This is argued in the blog under SRH. You can't have theories that are their own foundations. All theories MUST be based on other theories.

So it naturally falls that belief in a Material Reality was always going to have to go beyond Material Reality if it was ever to explain material reality.

Of course the hidden issue here is that to understand Classical Mechanical we needed create Quantum Mechanics. And it will naturally fall that to explain Quantum Mechanics we will need a new theory. That is perhaps a 100 years or more away; we can never tell.

So the Corollary of SRH is that there can be no Total Theory [self contained] of Everything.

At Uni we called the universal final theory Q (Ahead of any actual discovery). But Q is impossible cos it would also need to prove why -Q.

So it is logically necessary that Material Reality one day would fall to a theory not based on Material Reality.

But isn't SRH then in trouble? To understand SRH doesn't it say itself that it will need to depend upon something other than SRH call that SRH2. To be a self contained theory would be to contradict itself. For SRH applied to everything it would contradict SRH.

But what if SRH does not apply to everything? What if it does not apply to itself? Then it remains true that SRH is not a universal theory, and it means SRH can allow for at least one exception and one Universal Theory namely itself

Extraordinarily it means that SRH can be based upon itself without contradicting SRH!

Perhaps here I've finally cracked at least the form of the proof of SRH. This feels very Kantian that at least we can outline the shape of the universal theory before finding a candidate.

It it naturally follows that the universal theory candidate must be about self-reference in order to escape contradiction we have a great proof of SRH.

Let me take this further now:

The Universal Theory Q must deal with the issue of -Q. Now for a normal theory this break universality. -Q cannot be in terms of Q otherwise Q could prove -Q. A universal theory that cannot account for both Q and -Q fails universality. But it looks like universality must be contradiction then. We have either contradiction or inconsistency a la Godel if we ever seek Universality.

But what of the above theorem which states that

-(Q => -Q)

And that

P => Q then -(P => -Q) and -(Q => P)

where => means proves (within whatever calculus or set or rules this is).

can't we say that negating the theorem Q requires an exception, and that allows for Q.

Since the theorem required Q to account for -Q, then because the theorem is about self reference itself, the negation allows for an exception to the self-reference requirement and that allows a universal theorem.

==

Note: "Every rule has an exception" is a valid universal rule because if it is universally true then it has an exception, and that allows it to be the exception.

=unfinished...

"All theorems require proof by *other* theorems" looks like there is no universal theorem.

"All theorems cannot prove *their* negation" Both these look simple but they are making complex self referential statements. How do these behave under negation? This is the issue to formalise.

Where are things?

I'm doing a few unfinished posts at the moment cos of time restraints but wanted to revisit this old one.

This is the classic drawing of the current schematic on how vision happens. An object (e.g. a blue cup) reflects light which enters the eye and this stimulated the brain to cause consciousness of a "cup".

There is so much here but it doesn't need to get complex, but it does need to get "deep." Obviously deep cos we are discussing the very foundations of our vision and our "seeing" the world.

Now the first thing to note is a break any where in this system removes the cup. If the cup is not there then no cup. If a barrier is put between the cup and the eye to stop the light then no cup. If the lights are switched off so no light can reflect off the cup then no cup. If we do an Oedipus and remove our eyes then no cup. If we damage the optic nerve then no cup. If we remove the brain then no cup. If we are not there then no cup. Are those last two the same? Is removing the brain the same as removing the person? Not relevant to this post, but raises question of "self."  

Lets return to the barrier. It is drawn here and it splits the picture into 2 regions A and B. The question is are these regions the same?

Lets take region A and the cup. Its important to note that the cup occurs in two ways here. There is the cup in the picture which is being seen by "that" eye I have put in the picture. But we also need to note that the cup is being seen by us and our eyes as well. There are 2 cups here.

Quick excerpt from Wittgenstein to formalise this. For Wittgenstein meaning comes from how something is used. Language games he called it. The same ball can be used in many games depending upon the rules and practices. So this cup is being used in 2 ways here. One is the cup that has a place in a picture and also in the schema of vision so described, and the other is the cup "as it is", that is as we actually see it for ourselves right now.

The "as it is" is very interesting and has been given special note throughout history. It is recognised as the source of all knowledge and the foundation of reality. Importantly it is indivisible. You can't replace the blue cup "as it is" with the schema! If you did you have an SRH loop. It is rather that we start with the blue cup and build the scaffold of the schema on top of that. This is why the blue cup looks the same in both contexts. It is "as it is" and this is then hijacked into a schema that tries to explain how "as it is" arises. This is a self defeating. In order to cut the last branch on a tree you decide to stand on that branch, suddenly your system fails cos you didn't check for SRH. If you hadn't already seen the cup as it is how could you build the schema? So the cup as it is definitely does not depend on any schema! 

But now I wanted to use the schema all the same to point out something noted before.

We can see that a break anywhere in the schema removes the cup from sight.

You can use this to argue against "self existence." The naïve view is that what we see is what is there. But you can see in the schema that putting a wall between regions A and B means light no longer gets to the eye and the brain sees nothing. So the cup still exists, but that is not enough to be seen. This is the idea of noumenon and phenomenon. The "in itself" is the cup noumenon existing in the room, and the phenomenon is the full schema that allows it to be experienced. Modern science is very focused on noumena and wishes to abstract from phenomena. A hundred people can see the cup, but there is only one cup and science wants that one cup.

It can be seen that in so doing science puts an automatic limit on its ability to understand phenomena! Science rejects phenomena, how can it then study them! Science will need to change at some stage. But this idea has a long history. Plato most famously created the schema of the cave to illustrate how people get trapped by the world appearing as phenomena (shadows) and never rise to escape the cave and see things "in themselves" as pure forms.

Importantly Plato did identify that we get to the truth of things through thought. It is through correctly thinking about things that we get to the "in itself." For materialists the next move is to say that there is this world that is hidden but we can explore it through evidence. We layer more and more weight into this world. But we must ask the materialist what evidence is there for materialism? All there is is just evidence and thoughts.

And what is particularly worth noting is the importance of thinking to phenomena. When we learn a new thing we start to see it everywhere. A more unified view is that there are the "as it is" and then the mind does work to decide what things are. There are not two world's here but an "augmentation" of reality by the brain. This makes perfect sense today where we have technology that augments reality. I'm sure Dennett would agree the reason we even invented reality augmentation is because its how our brains already work. We are familiar with a "voice in our heads" as we talk to our self and narrate our own life. Morgan Freeman did not invent the film voice over in Shawshank Redemption, he was simply acting out how our brains already work.

Possible tricky unless you have experience of meditation but even the process by which things become a "thing" is really just mental augmentation. When we are half asleep and see this process slow down and even fail sometimes. We can wake up and take ages to actually put a name on that sound we can hear. But the moment we process the "sound" into the "alarm" suddenly a whole load of augmentation pops up. It triggers all the thoughts and actions of getting up and getting ready for work or whatever we plan to do. A friend in his half awake still dreaming state even saw the alarm as a giant buzzing wasp once.

So there is just one world with the "as it is" being the experience and the mental augmentation being the "in itself."

Now this is such a useful place to be. A whole load of problems disappear. For instance we often augment reality by calling things "mine." This is "my" experience, that is happening to "me". Really important to see this as augmentation. Freely augment away but never forget that this is all popups and stuff we are adding by processing the reality. What we may notice is a subtle confusion here. Yes it is happening, and this is a particular phenomenon that no one else is seeing so in that sense it is "mine" but no one owns that experience. You didn't pay for it (if you live in a capitalist system), you didn't make it, and no one even gave it to you: it is just there. It isn't yours. In fact there is no "you" to grasp for it anyway. Well there may be the idea of a "me" that reality has been augmented with: but an idea can't itself take ownership. The idea is suggesting it takes ownership, except you just point out there is no one in reality to actually carry out the wish. It's just a dream.

Where is the Blue Cup?

Now to close up let me get to the actual point of the post. There is a very simple but almost complete overlooked side to the schema above. Where actually is the cup? Buddha discusses this with Ananda in another way in the Shurangama Sutra but the result is the same. The materialists says the blue cup is where the picture of the blue cup is in the schema. The idealists say that is no good because with no one to see it there is no blue cup so it must be in the consciousness. But where is the consciousness? Modern Material-Idealists now say the brain. Some may say well if the brain by itself is no good and a cup by itself is no good so it must be in the thing that connects them. Perhaps it is the image in the eye. But blind people can get an image in the eye and still have no cup. Perhaps it is the light that links the cup and the eye. Perhaps it is the electrical signals. Perhaps there is a spirit. Perhaps there is a quantum state that encompasses the entire system including cup, light, nerves and brain.

Two stages to go and I'm finished.

(1) What we can say is that when we see something it becomes apparent. And it becomes apparent not in our eye, or in the brain but where it is. When we actually see a cup it is in the room and on the table. How silly to be discussing "where is the cup?" who ever asks such a stupid question. A kid can answer this. Hey son go get me my blue cup. Where is it? On the table. Ok dad. Is a perfectly simple exchange with no confusion. So how did we get to asking the question? It's that damn schema and the fact that it takes the cup and puts it in a very strange place. It puts it in the middle of the diagram and some thoughts about brains and stuff. That is where it is when we get asked the question philosophically! we know this because who ever set this up (me this time) went to lots of trouble to put the cup in a strange place already!

But it is at the same time revealing. Cups can be put in complex places, much more complex than a table. And this liberates much of the complexity that life throws at us. Many of us put cups in the strange place of "my possessions." Where is that!

(2) Now Buddha winds up (and I've never read it all yet) by easing up the idea that "we" are "our mind" is anywhere. Like the cup which can go to strange places, often without us even noticing its been put there, so we do the same with our ourselves. We put ourselves on tables, in houses, in relationships, in good times, in bad times, in bodies, in graves, in heaven. We like the cup are always putting our self somewhere and sometimes in a very complex way. But we aren't really moving at all any more than the cup above has been in a schema and then not. It all just reality augmentation and us playing around with thoughts.

So neither the cup nor ourselves is anywhere fixed it depends upon context and it depends what you mean. And if neither the cup nor our self is anywhere fixed then neither are we fixed at all. This is the avenue that leads some to liberate completely from all the troubles and uncertainties of life. Not by adding anything, and not by taking anything away, but just lubricating where things are so they can come and go more freely.

* and I never found a "place" for the actual thing I wanted to look at. How interesting! It was just that the idea that "I am experiencing" and "I am here at the centre of my world" contradict because how can I then experience the cup on the table. Don't I need be on the table as well to experience the cup? Or perhaps I have some remote sensing capability and while I am here and the cup is there I somehow can experience it. It doesn't make sense. Putting me anywhere is a problematic thing.

Tired of Western Propaganda? Lets look at mental health...

 I'm sure there is much to say about the underlying data of such comparison studies such as Western countries are more likely to diagnose mental heath, or people in poorer countries have other problems to worry about. But which ever way you try to avoid it the United States under performs in every measure of society and wellbeing. This is not good for a country like Nazi Germany or Israel who wishes to somehow claim superiority Über allem.

Now the US is conspicuous in wishing the world to consider it in someway special and different from other countries. Perhaps as a mean of justifying its totalitarian wish to rule the world. Let US rule you cos we are better. Problem is US is actually worse. Countries that fall under the guidance of US begin to socially and economically fail. This is offset by the advantage of favourable trade agreements and removal of sanctions and hostile military activity. But this cannot completely hide the rot that America represents.

Now how can the self proclaimed model country America rank as badly in depression as Africa and worse than those countries labelled by America as "evil" such as Russia and China. Perhaps US should start regime change and fixing itself before messing around with other countries?

General mental health conditions no different. Now it may be that the underlying data is suspect, but purely by law of averages somewhere the US should rate well in some matric. It doesn't. It is a failing country. Beware all those countries that wish to follow it, or are not strong enough to repel it.

It will be interesting to see the impact of US take over of Ukraine. Assuming Russia gives up control of the majority of Ukraine will the Ukrainians actually prosper?

Who has the worst health system? Answer: US by any measure.

So if we plot the total health spending (public + private) per capita against the average life expectancy we get a crude measure of the effectiveness of the health system. As can be seen the US spends far more than any country with no actual improvement in life expectancy. You are just as likely to die as someone in Chile.

Specifically about efficiency US is by far the least efficient health system wasting huge amounts of money with no improvements in life expectancy.

Now both graphs are skewed. Japan and UK both achieve the same life expectancy per $ spent on health care so their systems are comparable. This is clear in the second graph, not in the first. But a country that spends nothing on healthcare gets an infinite efficiency so the second graph becomes less meaningful as spending reduces.

Why we can't have our own kids

Chimpanzees we are told are 98.5% related to humans.

So how then do we also hear that siblings are 50% related?

It's because siblings only share 50% of the "variable" DNA. Most DNA is fixed, and only at a few sites are there variables.

It means that any two humans are more than 99.9% related and this number is even higher for humans from the same region and background.

So it means that a parent is 99.95% related to their children while a complete stranger is 99.9% related. It means that a parent is only 0.05% more related to their own children than a complete stranger.

To put that another way a completely stranger is 99.9% related to anyone's children.

It means that the complex process of finding a partner, having children and raising them affords us control over only 0.05% of our DNA. A person who does nothing can still see the vast majority of their DNA making it through to the next generation! That seems like a very cost effective approach!

Now evolution depends upon traits being selected for in the next generation but the process is slow as the variability is only 0.05% and sex and reproduction is incredibly conservative. Children are genetically incredibly similar to their parents and everyone else in the generation.

So that feeling of "your" own kids does not really have much of a genetic foundation. It is 99% cultural and derived from Capitalism and ownership. Even if you bring up a complete strangers child you are preserving 99.9% of your own DNA.

Admittedly parents bringing up random children will end the process of evolution as selection will be slowed or stopped. Now compared with another Capitalist population where children are only supported by their own families; it would be hard to say which would "do best." You might argue that rich parents would on average produce more children than poor so the society would evolve to be stronger and more able. But families still mix. A woman in a rich family can still sleep around and "bring in genes" from a poor family. Or perhaps bad genes will evolve randomly in the rich family and get stuck (as in fact we seen with inbreeding in the rich). So there are considerable random effects even in the controlled Capitalist society. It would take some more thought and modelling to really be clear how social organisation actually effects DNA.

The World was here before me

Its something so obvious that we don't think about it. But we also don't think about it cos it doesn't quite make sense.

As a "naïve realist" we think we see the world as it is.

But then we discover that the world was here before us.

What did it look like before us?

On one hand we think it looked the same. But then why couldn't we see it before we were born?

We couldn't see it before we were born because we had no eyes and no brain and no consciousness. It is as though we were sleeping before we were born. But then it means that the world didn't look like anything before we were born.

So how can it both look the same, and not look like anything?

Something doesn't make sense. We just don't think about it.

Its the same odd thing we get when we think about our personal experiences versus major events. In the West we all know where we were when we first heard about 9/11. We each have a personal experience and there was a shared major event. Both at the same time.

The issue here is what is called "conditionality" that things do not exist alone but depend upon other things.

What is the sound of a tree falling with no one to hear it? This is the same issue.

Obviously we "know" it made a sound, we can find evidence of the shock waves in the disturbed soil, and perhaps feathers where birds were disturbed into flight. But there was no sound in anyone's ear. For the "sound" in the usual sense someone needs to be there. And for "me" to hear it "I" needed to be there.

Now this puts me at the centre of the world in a way. If I am not there then no sound is made! Wow I am God!

Now this quickly does down the rabbit hole. But firstly note that the argument just made is that for a phenomenon to exist "I" need to be there. And then we might ask and how do I know whether I am there? Well it is only that there is a phenomenon. So its enough to have the sound to know I am here. Or more generally right now all the experiences I am now having prove I exist. This is exactly Descartes "I think therefore I am." But if the only way I know I am there is a phenomenon existing then what does "me" actually add. Why not just have the phenomenon and forget about any "I" being present?

Its been noted in fiction that memories of experiences are not enough to prove "I was there." Perhaps those are false memories, or implanted memories like in Total Recall. This is the modern version of Descartes Demon. And we might argue that even with an actual sound perhaps we are in a Matrix and the phenomenon is being implanted. But with the "present moment" while what we are experiencing may be in question, "that" we are experiencing cannot be faked. Even people in the Matrix experiencing fake experiences are still experiencing. "Present Moment" is like Einstein's Acceleration in General or Speed of Light in Special Relativity. Even relative philosophies must have some point of absolute, some bedrock that cannot be faked. If people try to fake the bed rock they end up defeating their own argument like someone sawing off a branch on which they sit. So "Present Moment" is an absolute that cannot be faked, but there is no need for a "self" in the present moment.

But we protest didn't we get here by observing that there was nothing before we were born and us being present is a condition for phenomena to manifest.

...

out of time TBC

 

 

Coal is the key to understanding the C20th

 

A thing that seems more obvious than anything is that the work a country does depends primarily on its access to energy. It's nothing to do with politics are economics or nonsense like this, its just how much there is for the economy to "eat". If one looks at the spread of bacteria the limiting factors are resources, and primarily energy. This has to be the first thing we look at with people too.

Now look at coal production in Asia in the C20th. Coal being the energy that began and fuelled the industrial revolution. That is UK way out on top for the whole century.

I've definitely heard it said that the real reason UK was able to create that global empire lay in its coal fields.

It all adds an extra dimension to Thatcher's War with miners in the 80s. These communities are actually what made the British Empire possible. Nothing to do with Capitalism or the British Elite system.

Instead I venture (after Veblen and other economists) that Capitalism is why only the wealthy elites really benefitted from the British Empire and this coal.

Its probably the biggest myth in the West that our prosperity is due to the defeat of Fascism or Communism and the success of the West in the Wars and the rise of Capitalism and global banking is the reason for the success.

Property system is also much heralded. Niall Ferguson argues that this is the reason that the US prospered while South America didn't. But he neglects to note the obvious facts that the North had the slave trade and incredibly cheap labour, and the near total genocide of natives to clear the land for industrial scale agriculture. He also neglects to mention US access to coal in the C20th.

If an army marches on its stomach, an economy produces on its energy source.

Its amazing how in the desperate attempt to justify the evils of the entirely avoidable world wars and the British and American expansion of their Empires the simplest truths can be perverted.

A Post for the US bots and secret services

 In the West we live under the US Empire. This means we are brainwashed by a pro-US propaganda. It means we ignore that the US is responsible for the world's biggest genocide of native people, and conducted the world's biggest slavery program to build the country and has represented totalitarianism and control of people since its very inceptions. At the very moment it supports the world's worst dictatorship in Saudi Arabia and drops 50 bombs a day on sovereign nations to control them and enforce its own globalist and totalitarian agenda. The US is the epitome of pure evil.

But in the English speaking world the US sells itself as good. Only the devil would be totally unaware of its own pure evil and try and lie to people that it is good.

Things happening is like going into a maze, thinking about the likelihood of such events is like leaving.

Comet C2/2017 K2 (PANSTARRS) is making its closest approach to Earth next week. Yahoo News writes:

The comet, called C/2017 K2 (PANSTARRS) or "K2", has been travelling for millions of years from its home in the frigid outer reaches of the solar system, where the temperature is about -262C.

Reading that makes you think this is some special event having something that has been travelling for millions of years approach us.

I blogged on this before. It is not a special event because we have not been tracking it for millions of years. Rather it has been tracking us. Perhaps for the comet it is a special event to be making its closest approach to Earth finally after all these years. That is assuming that Earth means anything to the comet. We think Earth is important, but its passed many things, perhaps we are not important.

Its this problem of entering a maze. There is only one way to get to where you are in the maze, but now try and get out. There are many choices to make and only 1 sequence of choices gets you back to the entrance.

Likewise there is only one way for the comet once it had strayed into to its new comet orbit to travel for all those millions of years. But there is a bewildering maze of possible events going backwards in time that we would never guess. At the start of today before reading about that comet we would never have thought of it because we are so overwhelmed already with other possible events in our maze.

This problem also occurs at junctions. The number of times a car we are behind turns the same way as us, or blocks us in some way, it is like the universe is conspiring to slow us down. But we need realise the car is only there because it is going somewhere too. And because it is there we are now thinking about it. It wouldn't be there unless it was heading somewhere and chances are its similar to us. They after all are possibly thinking the same thing about us.