ChatGPT: Heidegger vs Buddhism on Mineness

 In Heidegger's Being and Time he describes "Mineness" as a quality of Dasein. Does this contradict Buddhist observation that everything arises through its own causes and conditions and so belongs to nothing. Or would Buddhism says that "mineness" is a phenomenon that arises through its own causes and conditions and so while some things look like "mine" for example "my thoughts", that mineness is itself a phenomenon that is not mine.

ChatGPT said:

This is a great question, as it touches on the intersection of Heidegger's existential phenomenology and Buddhist metaphysics.

Heidegger’s "Mineness" (Jemeinigkeit)

In Being and Time, Heidegger describes Dasein (the being that we are) as always existing in a way that is mine (Jemeinigkeit). This means that Dasein is always in an individual, first-person way of being—it is not a thing among things but an existence that is always owned in a certain way. My experience of the world, my choices, my responsibility for my being—these all have an aspect of mineness because they belong to the way I uniquely exist.

Buddhist View on Mineness

Buddhism, particularly in its Madhyamaka and Yogācāra interpretations, denies the ultimate existence of an independently existing self (ātman). Instead, it holds that what we call the self is a dependently arisen phenomenon, composed of causes and conditions (the five aggregates: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness). From this view, the sense of mineness—the feeling that something belongs to "me"—is itself just another dependently arisen phenomenon.

So in response to your question, Buddhism would likely say:

1. Yes, mineness arises due to causes and conditions. It is a phenomenon that can be observed.
2. However, the mineness itself is not ultimately "mine" because the "I" to which it supposedly belongs is also dependently arisen and lacks inherent existence.

Do They Contradict?

At first glance, Heidegger's mineness seems to imply a kind of selfhood or ownership over one's being, while Buddhism deconstructs such ownership as an illusion. But if we look deeper:

• Heidegger’s mineness is not a claim about an ultimate self, but about the structure of experience. It does not assert an independent ego but describes the way being is always experienced as a personal and individual phenomenon.
• Buddhism would not deny that such an experience of mineness arises—it would just argue that it has no ultimate reality. It’s part of how beings perceive their existence but not an indicator of an independently existing self.

Thus, rather than a strict contradiction, we might say that Heidegger describes how experience appears to us (in a way that feels like mine), while Buddhism explains why that appearance does not indicate a substantial or independently existing self.

Would you say that helps bridge the perspectives, or do you see a stronger conflict between the two?

You said:

No that makes sense. The goal of Heidegger is Phenomenal analysis of the way things appear, while Buddhism is seeking to loosen our grip on a sense of permanent fixed reality so their goals and so approaches are slightly different anyway.

ChatGPT said:

Exactly! Their differing aims shape how they engage with concepts like mineness. Heidegger is interested in describing how being is experienced, while Buddhism is more concerned with seeing through that experience to reveal its lack of inherent existence.

You could say Heidegger focuses on disclosure—how things show up for us—whereas Buddhism aims at liberation—freeing us from clinging to those appearances as ultimately real. So while Heidegger describes mineness as an essential structure of experience, Buddhism would say it's a useful observation but ultimately part of the illusion of self.

It’s interesting how they can sometimes complement each other rather than outright contradict. Would you say that Heidegger’s analysis still has value from a Buddhist perspective, or does it reinforce attachment to a sense of self?