A full outline of the suggestion. Minds, Things and Universes

The argument is a form of John Searles famous Chinese Room argument. Here he argues that humans following rule books blindly (like machines do) do not understand the rules so how can computers be said to?

The argument proposed here is: the output of human minds, (i.e. in the form of symbols (like this email), or in the form of computing machines, or even paintings or music) cannot be understood in isolation from the mind.

Consider: if something could be understood "as independent from the mind", then you would not need a mind to understand it. Conversely if we need a mind to understand things, then things cannot be considered independent from the mind.

This has wide implications as has already been discovered and I expand below.

In advance: by "mind" I am not referring to a "thing", it is simply undefined so far. The form of the argument is natural language. The issue is one of processes.

What I was trying to show previously was the processes of the mathematician processing symbols. The symbols cannot process themselves so I was hoping to find evidence of the "mathematician" in the symbols. In particular the evidence that systems are incomplete and that this implies work outside the system. That has been done by Godel.

I'll reconstruct a similar argument.

If we define a set A = {x : x <= 3, x in N} = {1,2,3}

Now it is true that A is a subset of itself. But that doesn't mean that the definition of A can "write" itself. Clearly the mathematician has done work to understand the set constructor notation and ensure the equality. For example I've had to learn how to do this.

So let us define B = {x: x is in set constructor notation} this is like a set of all sets that can be constructed.

Unlike the precise x<=3 above, there is no formal set constructor notation that I know to define set constructor notation, I'm relying upon the reader to understand that informal set definition.

What Godel would do here in essence is to give each set-constructor a number so that he could refer to it within itself. That way you can construct the set constructor {x : x is this constructor, x is not in constructor notation}.

That is a member of the set which is a member by virtue of saying it is not a member. Thus the member can be seen to be a member (because of its form), but you try and prove within the system you get a contradiction. This shows for my purposes (and has been identified elsewhere) that "truth" cannot always be proven within the system and relies on something else.

This is the liar paradox which is expressed well like this:

The Liar Paradox. "Truth" for English sentences is not definable in English.
Proof. Suppose it is. Then so is its complement "False". Let s be the sentence "This sentence is false" . Since the phrase "This sentence" refers to s, we have s iff "This sentence is false" iff "s is false" iff not s. A contradiction.

There are many oddities all very similar: consider Richard's Paradox which I quite like.

It all points to systems not being self-sufficient and I am taking that to point to the fact that if they were then why are minds needed to work on them?

Turing machines again find limitations in the halting problem (same link as Liar Paradox is good). I am trying to write a Turing machine on a Turing machine, its proving hard - any one know if it is possible? Obviously Turing machines carry the name Turing because of the work "He" did not the machines themselves.

Another paradox comes about like this:

Take a simple set system, we must define 2 things.
The Universal set (U), e.g. the colours = {red, white, blue, green}
A subset of U obeying some rule, A = {x: x is in the Union Jack, x in U}
So A = {red, white, blue}

The Universal is a special type of set which allows the complement: A' = U - A = {green}

Now the Universal set is "the universe of discourse", or "all the things we are talking about", or the "context". A new Universal set arises whenever we change subject, clearly that is the choice and work of the operator (mind).

Let me change subject to U1 = {x: x is four letter words} and define the set B = {x: x words beginning with "b", x in U1}

So we can see that "blue" is now a member of B. What has become of "green" in this universe? it doesn't exist. This is well documented in some philosophy esp. Buddhism that the mind creates existence, or that things have no existence outside the "field of discource".

Now if we can refer to the elements under discourse U, can we also refer to the "elements not-under discourse" for example {green} in this example. Well if we did then it would be under discourse and therefore part of U which contradicts U's definition, and if we don't then what is the meaning of "changing subject". Clearly the person using the set theory must be free from the field of discourse in order to define the U from the many elements which are not in U.

That is the more general paradox that we know that there are things outside our field of "view" or discussion, but if we try to refer to them they come under our field of view or discussion. So it is impossible to refer to things outside the field of view, or discussion, even while knowing they are there. How is that possible? i.e. there are things in the room next door that I can't see, but I know they are there... so what do they look like? we sort of imagine ghostly things that are both what they would look like if they were here, but which aren't here. Well I suspect in general that is called God to some, and I call it mind. Its the unbounded limits beyond the discourse which can't be in the discourse, but we know are there anyway.

The implications:
Materialist theories posit existence as a fundamental starting point. As seen above, existence is a product of mind or at least the field of discourse. Thus any theory trying to explain mind in terms of existences is flawed. I just had a "discussion" with a American neuro-scientist on the web and the unquestionable faith he put in existence was extraordinary. On one hand he says that the brain creates our world-view, on the other hand he says that world creates our brain. Well I pointed out if the world exists already what is the brain doing? He says it is creating a "representation" of the world. I said then what you call "the world" is only a "representation" since you are your brain, a representation of what? He didn't understand. Daniel Dennett is in the same camp, as is Dawkins and their hard materialist ilk.

AI etc runs into the same problems. Clearly we could make a human, women make humans every day. Its that this would not give us insight into mind. Mind is not brain because brain is only a field of discourse of mind.

Physics. There are a lot of quantum theories to explain mind and world. Again minds must be used ultimately to operate these theories and so these theories only posit a field of discourse. If machines could be made to operate these theories (like Deep Thought of Hitch Hikers fame) they would fall foul of the same problems surely?