2 types of Self

Considering the SRH ...

When we give something self-identity (that is to say that it exists as a discrete entity separate from other entities - something that might be called itself) we are actually doing one of two things.

1) We are definiting it as separate from other entities. For example I am "Alva Gosson" as opposed to anyone else. "Alva Gosson" thus denotes a self defined in relation to other things. This I will call "typeself". I am one of a type.

2) When we define something as existing as opposed to not-existing - i.e. in relation to "Nothingness" (see previous post on that - Nothingness which is not a thing or self itself) . This I will call tokenself.

The second type is the type of self which provides the true ammunition for philosophy and religion. The first type is trivial.

I was considering my favourite format of sets to illustrate this.

Suppose we construct a universal set {a,b}.

What we have done is take two entities and separate them by giving them different names. "'a" depends upon "b" and vice verse for this separation. Thus we can generate a powerset of 4 useful distinct sets from this universal set and describe 4 states: {}, {a}, {b}, {a,b}.

If we define a universal set with one member {a} a question arises as to what "a" means. What are distinguishing "a" from? What then is the point of naming it since we can only talk of "a". For example when we talk of mathematics to a student we never refer to breathing because breathing is assumed and constant for all mathematics teaching. Why would we keep refering to breathing since it never changes? Likewise in a set with one object what is the meaning of giving it a name?

The reason why it is meaningful is because of the empty set {}. Thus we can derive 2 sets from the universal {a}: {} and {a}.

The names in these two sets are subtly different then: {a} refers to a tokenself only while {a,b} refers to typeself also.

Now the relevance to the SRH is that if it can be shown (logically) that a single reference depends upon its fellow members in some way for its meaning then it follows that the "self" it refers to is actually constructed upon the relationship between the "self" and "others". The "self" then quite apart from being a discrete entity is actually an embodiment of the whole which contradicts the notion of "self".

Now the remaining issue is to find that contradition within some formal system.